Archive for the ‘Identity Theory’ Category
Tuesday, December 2nd, 2008
Thanks Axel for highlighting my TEC 2009 talk abstract — you’re much better at publicizing my upcoming speaking plans than I am, something I need to improve upon!
My plans for TEC 2009 are indeed to talk about a Survivalist’s Guide to Identity Management. In my years working in this space, I can’t help but note that most of the things that companies pay me to unravel are things that a little foresight and planning could have rendered unimportant – often they come down to configuration decisions made arbitrarily in the absence of any guiding principle. I believe that if you can introduce some simple discipline into IT practices early on in a company lifecycle, you can drastically reduce the complexity, and therefore the cost of automating your processes and applications when the time comes. My goal is to document that discipline in very simple terms, and then to demonstrate how a pragmatic IT department can go on to derive benefit from that discipline.
I can’t tell how much I’m looking forward to this presentation – It is a topic very near and dear to my heart, and something I hope to enlarge upon whenever I can, for a long time to come.
Monday, November 24th, 2008
I love working with smart people. I went into the ICF schemas working group call with my set of gobbled-together proposals, and everybody seized on it and started breaking those ideas down into their separate pieces, using language with far more structure than my own words.
There were some excellent points made:
- What are the expectations of the “Display Claim” versus the actual claim in providing human-readable claim values? Is it reasonable (or even preferable) to define a claim value that is not human-readable and trust that the STS will be responsible for mapping that value to something useful?
- Is it expected that the selector will do a metadata discovery on each and every claim passed? I had never even thought of such a thing, so will have to learn more.
I will keep you up to date with the conversation, which is expected to continue on the working group mailing list this week. The mailing group is: http://groups.google.ca/group/icf-wg-schemas, I believe anyone can read, but you have to be an ICF member to participate. If you are keen to participate, let me know.
Monday, November 24th, 2008
During IIW, the ICF Schema Working Group proposed and approved its first standardized claim definition. I’ve been following the workings of the schema group but not closely, and I was taken by surprise at the values defined as part of this precedent-setting claim element:
Claim Name: age-18-or-over
Proposed Values:
What? Want to know what the values MEAN? Sorry, you’ll have to look that up. What you see above is what a Mother or Father will see when they view values passed between the Identity Provider they are trusting to make claims about their children’s age, and a website that may restrict content based on that value.
Do you see the problem? Why on earth even have a selector if the standard claims we propose are not understandable by end users? Why use a meaningless number? To make it easier for the machines? For the developers? That’s crazy! Why don’t we make it easier for the people that are making selector-level security decisions on a daily basis? These schema types have to be created so that whenever possible, the data passed is legible to those attempting to understand the context of identity data flowing around them. Heck, if we created a vocabulary for content that could be distinctly identified and parsed by Selectors, we could even localize.
It’s taken me since IIW to really get my head around this – but I believe we need to set some very specific best practices around these schema elements, first and foremost being the primary design principle that these atomic elements should be designed for regular people, not for developers, and not for machines.
I’m going to do my best to argue this point today on the ICF working group call. If you think this is important, whatever your stance on the issue might be, I urge you to join the Information Card Foundation and to make your voice heard. Contact me if you aren’t sure what you need in order to join, I will put you in touch with the right people.
I think that best practices around claims schema is THE MOST IMPORTANT thing happening right now. It is worth taking the time to get this right. We’ll only get one shot at it.
The public version of the claim catalog is here: https://informationcard.net/wiki/index.php/Claim_Catalog
Thursday, November 13th, 2008
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This one takes your password
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And this one too
Today was an interesting day for the Identity geeks of the world. A viral outbreak of concern broke out among twitter users over site called “Twitterank”. Twitterank asks for your credentials and displays a number theoretically outlining your theoretical socal viability in the twitterverse.
Once the word “phishing” became attached to the service, people became fascinated. I have no idea of the order of it all – but several things happened:
- A ridiculous number of people decided to try out the alleged phishing site. Some of them even changed their password afterwards.
- References were passed around to a site called “Twitterawesomeness” that appears to exist as a very pointed statement about how easy it is to phish a site like twitterank. The disclaimer states:
I’m in ur Twitterz, stealin ur credz!
It’s ok, 178 other people gave their passwords too!
- The author of Twitterank came out with this statement:
I’m not out to steal ur twitterz. Frankly, I wish I didn’t have to ask for your account info, but Twitter doesn’t offer APIs using any other authentication mechanism (according to the docs). So blame them.
So let’s see then:
- twitterank is right. The best way to protect the passwords of the users of your service is to provide alternatives to giving away your password. Granting permission for another entity to see your data is something Twitter can securely enable – or ignore. We know where they stand so far.
- twitterawesomeness is right too. It doesn’t matter whether twitterank is crooked or honest. Anyone who wishes to spend the 10 minutes to emulate twitterank’s main page can harvest passwords, if they can get people to click on a modified link. Obviously not a difficult task – especially when people only see a “tinyurl” for most of the links they click. Heck, just register “twitterrank.com”. People will come to you.
- To all you folks who changed your password — do you use that password anywhere else? Cause if I were going to steal username/password combinations, it certainly wouldn’t be to read a twitter stream. But I’m sure nobody would be crazy enough to use the same combo at twitter and at their bank… what about the password you might have had when you tried the service a month ago?
- In fact – even if you don’t use that combination at your bank, I might be able to still get there. I would use the credentials to harvest your email address from twitter, and then try to login to that email account. If I was lucky and got a hit, I could then start putting your email address into password recovery pages for all sorts of interesting places. Once you have email, you have the keys to the kingdom.
Of course, I could also just phish your bank site. Occam’s razor applies here. Still, the point has been proven.
Mashable Link
ZDNet Link
Thursday, October 30th, 2008
Electronic Arts has just backed into an interesting twist to the TOS story. They are linking your online terms of service to the physical video games you buy — if you violate their online TOS, your right to run every video game linked to that account will be revoked.
This adds a massive lightning stroke of accountability into the affair, doesn’t it? Suddenly, the forums aren’t just a “value-add”, they are also a potential “value-take-away”. I have this picture in my head of Family Member A explaining to Family Members B and C how A lost his/her temper in the EA forums last night, and now the whole family has lost not only their access to their games, but possibly their game statistics & reputations too, depending on what EA does to enforce the ban and the subsequent serial number invalidation. Ah, it all comes back to Identity mgmt and asset mgmt, doesn’t it?
I suppose you could consider this the Real-time Blackhole List approach to reputation & social networking.
Thursday, July 31st, 2008
As lost as we might be right now, the future is very, very bright. One of the biggest forcing functions that I see on the horizon is cloud computing. It’s one thing to have a whole bunch of internally controlled silos that don’t talk to each other — but imagine all those silos spread across the internet.
Cloud computing is a practice that garners high risk without disciplined Identity Management. Enterprises have traditionally had the luxury of laziness when it comes to application integration because removal of physical and network access can compensate for late or non-existent deprovisioning of internal accounts. There is no corporate perimeter to save you with cloud computing. Automated Enterprise control of at least web access or account status is the only way to mitigate the risk for customers of any size – and this is a great thing, because it means that practically every customer of a cloud service has an identical worry. When the vast majority of the the client base has an issue, that issue gets vendor attention.
In addition, it is obvious that a huge number of SMALLER Enterprises are going to subscribe to cloud services. More than anything, I’d like to see resources in place such that at the time a smaller company makes that jump, they can find and follow a few cookbook Identity practices that most Enterprises don’t think to care about until they have severe pain. If we can help smaller companies to institute solid, integrated Identity practices BEFORE they buy big HR products and massive internal help desk systems and complicated document management software, maybe we can ease the pain before it ever starts, rather than having to apply band-aids after the fact. Preventative medicine is so much cheaper for all, isn’t it? Perhaps when faced with the choice of adopting an easy-to-integrate cloud service or an impossible-to-integrate in-house software product, companies will choose easy-to-integrate. If that happens, suddenly those big, lumbering software vendors might get a clue that they cannot operate in a vacuum, and that ease of integration matters.
Case in point: the company I work for, Nulli Secundus. We recently abandoned our Sun Messaging Server installation for a cloud service. One of the biggest complaints about Sun Messaging Server was its complete and utter inability to facilitate integration of the web client into our SSO infrastructure – not being able to integrate is pretty embarrassing for a company that specializes in Web Access Management. With the cloud service, SAML support is already there, waiting for us. The decision was a no-brainer, the cloud service made it unbelievably easy to switch. I imagine a lot of small companies are doing the same thing. Once we get SAML integration working for this first service, integration of following SAML-enabled services will be effortless – application sales & marketing teams with any kind of intelligence should see that this waiting and available infrastructure is great sales leverage. These are the trends that turn into tipping points enacting massive change – we just need to seize the opportunity and provide guidance & pressure in order to maximize the benefit while things are forming and flexible.
So – our current state doesn’t keep me up at night. Not when we have all of this opportunity in front of us…
Tuesday, July 15th, 2008
The track I spent almost all of my time at this year’s Catalyst conference was: “Identity Management: Are we There Yet?”
I came out of that track convinced that we have lost touch with the actual question of why we are doing all this work in the first place. Long before I attended Catalyst, I’ve become more and more worried about the way in which companies are being “assisted” in their work around Identity Management. It seems to be all about ‘getting’ the right product/services, and not about finding a solution that fills a need.
In my opinion, and you’re very welcome to disagree here, nobody “gets” Identity Management. It is not a destination that you can arrive at. It is more like a tour you can take, where you can have a different experience depending on how much time you have, how much money you are willing to spend, and what your particular preferences might be. You might take a slightly different tour every year — but you never stop taking tours, because the experience you might have can always change and improve, because there is a never-ending variance in what you can see, and because the sights are not static – the world changes.
What has happened in Identity Management in the last two years is generally a great thing — niche solutions are evolving to respond to demand that is too specialized for the big Identity & Access frameworks to build in (product fields like Privilege Management and Adaptive Access Control are examples of this). In addition, there has been a product response to the obvious need to have accurate and complete data on which to base Identity and Access Policy upon – examples of this include Role Management and Mining. Ideally, the result of all this innovation should be that a patchwork of products are evolving to cover more of any given company’s needs out of the box.
In reality, however, I don’t see a patchwork of complimentary products – I see a whole bunch of products with a whole bunch of overlap and no obvious or well-stated way for an Enterprise to figure out how to knit it all into an actual solution for their original problem. Perhaps I’ve just not read the right documentation, but I couldn’t tell you how or whether Privilege Management solutions integrate with provisioning solutions in order to have good combined audit reports. I have no idea how an Entitlement Management solution might co-exist with an Access Management solution. I see a fairly strong divide between “Corporate” workflow systems like Remedy and “Identity” workflow systems like those in Novell Identity Manager or Sun Identity Manager that I would like to see go away.
At Catalyst, I learned a fair bit about each little type of Tinkertoy. What I wanted was more of a sense of the different ways that different Enterprises might wish to assemble something useful from all the pieces. Perhaps Burton has expanded their reference architecture to include these new niche product genres and they just didn’t present that architecture at Catalyst (or perhaps I missed it) ? If not, I hope that such a thing is on their slate in the near future, I think it would help a lot.
So here we are, a little bit lost, I think. Certainly not “There” – but I think the expectation that anyone ever gets “There” is false anyway. In the process of deciding that we’re lost, I had to sit and think about what exactly Enterprises expect to accomplish in buying Identity product; I’ve come up with my own definition, in as concise a form as I can think to make it; I’ll post it shortly and see how it stands up to scrutiny.
Thursday, July 3rd, 2008
I have an ugly confession to make. I watched the rise of compliance as a business driver for Identity Management, and was pleased but not particularly interested in what it was that suddenly opened the budgetary gates for the projects I was part of.
When I thought of compliance, I would briefly consider how I was helping executives sign little pieces of paper that kept them out of hot water with the auditors, and then I would go back to thinking about organizational efficiency, process for the sake of bringing order to chaos. It’s easy to say that compliance is important, without ever understanding why it is so.
This is before I saw Nick Leeson speak at this year’s Catalyst conference.
You can’t listen to Nick’s story without your jaw dropping. Nick was the trader who caused the collapse of the Barings Merchant Bank in 1995. He was able to do what he did, because he could control every single piece of information that might have led to his discovery. His superiors didn’t understand the business, and therefore could only take Nick’s word for everything. Same went for his auditors. The resulting business failure was unimaginable.
Sitting in the room, listening with disbelief and amazement to this story, everything clicked for me. Everything I do and recommend in the Enterprise Identity world is applicable to this one story.
There are two things that happen in a provisioning project that make a compliance difference I had never considered before:
- We create observability in systems beyond the control of the asset owner.
- We create referential integrity for systems such that account activity does not occur in a vacuum.
The goal is not necessarily to catch bad guys here. The goal is to ensure that nobody can take an action and also hide that action. When every account has to resolve to a real person in the Enterprise, and any account created that doesn’t do so shows up on an audit report without the system owner having any say in the matter – well that makes a difference. When the reports and summaries that are generated happen out of the control of those who might wish to change the data within – it makes a difference.
And when the executive sponsorship of an Identity Management program are truly behind a project such as provisioning, and ensure that the project stays on target and that at the end, the compliance targets match & reflect the BUSINESS (a feat that no IdM consultant can know for sure they have accomplished) — it makes a difference.
I’m not sure that I’ve expressed this well — but I can tell you that I will do my job differently from now on. From now on, when I talk about compliance, I will not be thinking of making the lives of the CxO’s easier and/or more worry-free. I will be thinking about how I can make sure that if there is a cause to worry, it will cross the desk of the person who can recognize it and act on it. It is a small difference, but a critical one.
Tuesday, May 27th, 2008
As a result of a bit too much time spent watching American TV in hotel rooms this month, I decided to check out the URL of an interesting product. The BenderBall is a little tiny thing that I’m convinced would be perfect for trying to keep in shape at the cabin.
At this point — I have generally decided I want the product. I’ve remembered the URL. I’ve visited the site on the web. I’ve clicked the “Update Cart” button. I’m not a big “shopper” so to get me to this point is a rare occurrence. Suddenly I’m presented with the payment page, and I see the one thing that GUARANTEES I will not buy the product:

To force me to subscribe to the “special offer” list in order to get a Shipping Confirmation is unacceptable, and I will not pay $$ to a company who attempts to coerce me into doing so.
Yes, this company has a product I want, but the barrier to pulling out that credit card is already high, and now they have blown my trust of their business practices. I’m already suspicious of infomercial sites to begin with.
I would however, buy this product through either a bricks & mortar establishment, or through a trusted provider such as Amazon. Why? Because I can do so without putting as much of my data into the sleazy vendor’s hands.
I guess my abs will just have to stay flabby. :)
Thursday, May 15th, 2008
I’m sitting in the Data Sharing Summit after a conversation about what can go wrong with data portability, all full of wonderment and questions — I figure I’ll blog my heart out while I can still embrace my current simplistic view of this area :)
I feel a huge sense of dissatisfaction when I listen to application developers talking about privacy. They talk about how a given person can create a view of themselves that can be consumed by an application – but the vocabulary they use reminds me of assembly programming. Of course, the folks who write the specs and the folks who implement those specs must understand this level of granularity – but can’t there be something more palatable put in front of the users?
Every person who interacts with another makes a personal risk assessment about the action they are about to take. At the very beginning, all you can really do is look at the very superficial things that people advertise about themselves, and interpret those things within the context of the current community. In real life, this means that initiating a conversation on heavy metal with a person wearing a Metallica t-shirt is probably not risky within most contexts. In the same way, you might choose to confidently drop a literary reference in a conversation with a person who has a copy of ‘The Master & Margarita’ in his hand.
This is theoretically analogous with online entities like interest groups within social networks, it gives fellow users a chance to make initial guesses on the type of person they are dealing with. But I have to ask — why is it that we have nice warm fuzzy interfaces for users to express their preferences, affiliations, personal views and all sorts of context such that other people can synthesize a gestalt of a person and make a risk assessment, but the application can do no such thing?
What about allowing a user to choose a set of simple, private parameters that represent a very coarse-grained view of how that user might wish to be treated by the application? If I tell Linkedin that I want to be treated like a quiet, conservative, privacy-concerned person who keeps to themselves, I think that LinkedIn can guess how I would feel about my data being exported. If I wanted LinkedIn to treat me slightly less stereotypically in some circumstances, I should be able to dive into the assembly language and tweak things – but I’ll bet most people would be fine with broad strokes as a starting point.
Alternatively, perhaps I tell Facebook that I’m an extrovert with a great sense of humor who loves to connect but who is concerned about how photos with me as the subject are published to the world. Again, I think there are interpretations that can be made with respect to the boundaries that this user wishes to set.
Would this perfectly work every time? Certainly not. But neither does the real world model. At least maybe this could be a way to mitigate the fact that the social graph with respect to data portability/privacy is in fact an interconnected set of multi-dimensional matrices that represents the mother of all provisioning problems – every person dealing with every attribute of every relationship within every community they are a part of, and now also between many of the communities they are part of.
Here is what I envision. Imagine a very small number of possible attributes to describe a person’s privacy tolerance, that are displayed as part of your account settings. My guess is, if you see a descriptive word in your account that is the default, but doesn’t describe you, you will go and change it (rather than just ignoring a wall of possible privacy settings that doesn’t give you any interpretation of the implications). Perhaps to be more visual, you could set up an equalizer at the bottom of the page representing different ranges of tolerance for various uses of data, that users can set with one button click by using a preset and then fine tune if needed.
Hm, I wonder what the privacy version of the “stadium” preset would be? :)
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